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SYMPOSIUM—PERSPECTIVES ON RACIAL JUSTICE IN THE
ERA OF #BLACKLIVESMATTER
Harris Freeman*
FOREWORD—POLICE MISCONDUCT AND KIBBE V. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD
The Law Review’s 2017 symposium, “Perspectives on Racial
Justice in the Era of #BlackLivesMatter,” appropriately opened with
a panel that addressed the ongoing challenge of combatting police
misconduct, as seen through the lens of Kibbe v. City of Springfield,1 a
civil rights case that unfolded in Western Massachusetts and
reached the United States Supreme Court thirty years ago. Kibbe
presented the Court with the question of what the proper standard
of liability should be for a municipality accused of a civil rights
violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for inadequately training a police
officer who violates a person’s civil rights.2
The legal issue first presented to the Court in Kibbe remains
timely. It sits at the root of the Black Lives Matter (BLM)
movement’s argument that the federal courts have proven incapable
of addressing a constant stream of racially driven assaults and
killings by police officers against Black individuals.3
BLM’s
viewpoint continues to resonate, sparking demonstrations and a
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1. See generally City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257 (1987).
2. Id. at 258.
3. See generally Bridgette Baldwin, Black, White, and Blue: Bias, Profiling, and
Policing in the Age of Black Lives Matter, 40 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 431 (2018).
393

394

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:393

public outcry each time these assaults occur and the legal system
fails to hold police and municipal governments legally accountable
for the deaths and brutal treatment of Black and Brown victims of
state-sponsored violence.4 This reality highlights what is widely
criticized as a problematic standard of liability governing these civil
rights disputes, particularly because there has been a plethora of
eyewitness accounts of police misconduct and a stunning number of
citizens who have video-recorded these incidents on their cell
phones.5
The Kibbe panel featured the attorneys who litigated Kibbe,
Terry Nagel and Edward Pikula, both alumni of the Western New
England University School of Law (WNEU). Attorney Nagel
represented the civil rights claimant, and Attorney Pikula
represented the City of Springfield and its police officer defendants.
Terry Nagel is currently senior staff counsel for the Committee for
Public Counsel Services. Ed Pikula is city solicitor for the City of
Springfield. When they argued the case at the U.S. Supreme Court,
Terry and Ed were only three to five years out of law school.
The panel concluded with a presentation by Dr. Bridgette
Baldwin, a WNEU Law faculty member, who focused on the
disturbing social roots of police misconduct in America and the
resulting rash of killings of African Americans by police officers that
has given rise to BLM.6
Kibbe falls within a line of cases that reached the Supreme Court
in the wake of the historic civil rights movement of the last century.
Civil rights organizations sought to breathe life into 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the post-Civil War statute enacted in 1871 during Reconstruction to
provide a remedy for government-sponsored Ku Klux Klan violence
against African Americans and to provide a means of enforcing the
newly enacted Amendments to the U.S. Constitution that ended
slavery and established equal rights for African Americans. 7 Section
1983 remained dormant and without judicial sanction until 1961
when the Court decided Monroe v. Pape,8 the historic ruling that

4. Id. at 433–37.
5. Id. at 439.
6. Dr. Baldwin’s symposium contribution can be found in this Issue, Bridgette
Baldwin, Black, White, and Blue: Bias, Profiling, and Policing in the Age of Black Lives
Matter, 40 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 431 (2018).
7. Transcript of Kibbe Panel with Remarks by Ed Pikula and Terry Nagel at 1 (Oct.
20, 2017) (on file with author).
8. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

2018]

RACIAL JUSTICE IN THE ERA OF #BLACKLIVESMATTER

395

Chicago police officers violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments when they engaged in a warrantless invasion of the
home of an African American family, purportedly seeking a suspect
in a murder investigation. The police forced the parents to stand
naked in front of their four children as they ransacked the house. 9 It
turned out the police were mistaken; no one in that house was under
suspicion.
This was a watershed moment; Monroe was the first time that
§ 1983 was used to hold police civilly liable for civil rights violations.
However, the Supreme Court dismissed the claims in the case
brought against the City of Chicago, finding that the City was not a
“person” under this Civil Rights Act.10 The dismissal of the municipal
claims significantly curtailed the remedial impact of § 1983,
shielding municipal coffers from the reach of successful civil rights
litigants.
It took civil rights lawyers and their clients another seventeen
years to reverse Monroe and persuade the Court that a municipality
is a “person” that can be compelled to pay monetary damages for
violations of constitutional rights.11 Ed Pikula stressed, however,
that Monell did not establish an automatic windfall for civil rights
litigants every time it was proven that a police officer engaged in a
civil rights violation: “the Court said the city is a person but it can’t
be held liable just on the basis of respondeat superior.”12 The fact
that a city employs the police officers “is not enough, you need to
prove that the city itself caused this violation . . . .”13
Kibbe was a wrongful death case involving a botched police
chase of a suspect. In 1981, when Terry Nagle filed Kibbe as a
§ 1983 case in the Massachusetts federal district court in Springfield,
three things about the scope of municipal liability under § 1983
were evident on the facts of the case. First, that the City of
Springfield had exposure under Monell for the allegations of
constitutional violations alleged by the plaintiff if it could be proven
at trial that the violation resulted from the municipality’s custom or

9. Id. at 169.
10. Id. at 191.
11. See generally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
12. Transcript of Kibbe Panel with Remarks by Ed Pikula and Terry Nagel at 2
(Oct. 20, 2017) (on file with author).
13. Id.
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policy.14 Second, as Ed and Terry both pointed out, the allegations of
police misconduct were bolstered by evidence that the Springfield
police were not properly trained in carrying out police chases of a
suspect. Third, that the standard of liability to be imposed on the
municipal defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was definitely not one of
respondeat superior; but what the correct standard should be—
negligence, recklessness of some kind, or something like deliberate
indifference—was not a settled question of law.
Terry Nagel was handed a compelling set of facts in Kibbe. He
used them to present the proposition that a municipality should be
liable under the Monell standard if it could be proven that the police
misconduct at issue was caused by a custom or policy of
inadequately training its police officers to engage in a police chase of
a suspect.
Indeed, in Kibbe, the victim, Clinton Thurston, died from a
police-fired bullet to his brain, fired during his attempt to evade
arrest in the course of a “low-speed chase, not unlike O.J. Simpson’s,
never over 45 miles per hour.” 15 It all began with a 911 call.
Thurston had violated a restraining order requiring him to stay
away from his girlfriend, Pamela Etter.16 It was reported that
Thurston had abducted Etter and was proceeding by car to Lois
Thurston Kibbe’s house; she was Thurston’s sister and became the
administrator of Thurston’s estate and the plaintiff in the case.
The ensuing chase involved police cruisers, ineptly executed
roadblocks, and ultimately an officer on a motorcycle that fired the
fatal shot through Thurston’s car window. As Ed Pikula explained,
Thurston drove past an initial roadblock at about twenty-five miles
per hour; the officers were brandishing guns and one fired at
Thurston’s car.17 Testimony at trial indicates that police were
allowed to use firearms to affect an arrest if an officer reasonably
believed that the crime in question included the use of deadly force.
Under these rules, Ed Pikula argued that the vehicle Thurston was
driving could have been considered a deadly weapon.18 A second

14. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
15. Transcript of Kibbe Panel with Remarks by Ed Pikula and Terry Nagel at 5
(Oct. 20, 2017) (on file with author).
16. Brief for Respondent at 2, City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257 (1986) (No.
85-1217), 1986 WL 728319, at *2.
17. Transcript of Kibbe Panel with Remarks by Ed Pikula and Terry Nagel at 1
(Oct. 20, 2017) (on file with author).
18. Id.
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roadblock—with a police vehicle blocking the right-hand lane and
an officer standing in the middle of the three other lanes waving his
hands to flag down Thurston—was also ineffective at halting
Thurston. The City claimed that Thurston swerved toward the
officer. At that point, the City argued a shoot to kill approach was
warranted.
Next, a motorcycle officer, Theodore Perry, accelerated past the
police cruisers and drove alongside the driver’s side of Thurston’s
car. Perry did not hear instructions that motorcycled officers should
stay out of the pursuit. After attempts to engage Thurston, when
Thurston’s vehicle swerved toward Perry, the officer fired shots.
The first went through a window of a house; the second struck
Thurston in the brain. His car rolled to a stop two houses from his
sister’s residence.19 An officer ordered Thurston out of the car; he
was unresponsive. Nevertheless, an officer struck Thurston on the
head with a flashlight, dragged him out of the car, and handcuffed
him face down. Perry failed to report that he shot Thurston and the
officers involved in Thurston’s transport to the hospital were not
told that Thurston was shot. 20 He was pronounced dead at the
hospital.
Former Springfield mayor and then district court judge, Frank
Freedman oversaw the Kibbe trial. Only Officer Perry, who shot and
killed Thurston, but not the other three officers on trial, was found
to have violated Thurston’s civil rights. The jury awarded one dollar
in compensatory damages and $500 in punitive damages chargeable
to Thurston. But the jury found the City of Springfield violated
Thurston’s civil rights and awarded his estate $50,000. The City
appealed the verdict.
Nagel’s argument from the beginning of the case was that the
City was liable for Thurston’s death due to inadequate training of its
officers under a gross negligence standard.21 Nagel persuaded the
jury that the City’s policy itself did not have to command a civil
rights violation, “[W]e were talking about city training that was
inadequate and the way that you could tell was that every policeman
involved . . . operated in a ‘keystone cops’ kind of approach to the
stop, resulting in” Thurston’s death.22 “[T]he only way this could

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 6.
Id.
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have happened was if they weren’t trained on how to do stops.” 23
Under this theory, Nagel’s argument avoided the result required by
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, which overturned a $1.5 million judgment
against the city because the jury inferred § 1983 liability based on
inadequate training or supervision “solely” from a “‘single incident’
of police misconduct . . . standing alone.”24
The First Circuit did not disagree and wrote an extensive
analysis to distinguish the factual grounds for the jury’s ruling from
the facts in Tuttle.25 Although it considered Kibbe a “close case,” the
appeals court concluded that it was “unable to say that no jury could
find that the City was grossly negligent in failing to train its officers,
causing their use of excessive force against Clinton Thurston.” 26
Relying on this holding, at the Supreme Court Nagel argued gross
negligence in police training was evident, not from a single incident
of excessive force, but rather from the ineffective police roadblocks
and parade of police vehicles chasing Thurston, and the improper
use of firearms against an unarmed civilian that amounted to a “Clint
Eastwood approach to the use of deadly force.”27
The crux of the City’s argument to the Supreme Court was based
on Pikula’s post-trial motion for a directed verdict,28 in which he
argued that imposing any variant of a negligence standard to the
City was contrary to the holding in Monell; “you need recklessness or
something like deliberate indifference”29—certainly more than gross
23. Id.
24. Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801, 805 (1st Cir. 1985); see also
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985).
25. See Kibbe, 777 F.2d at 805–06.
26. Id. at 807. The court further explained:
Here, in an admittedly close case, the evidence consisted principally of: (1)
testimony that there was but little guidance for undertaking an automobile
chase; (2) testimony, contrary to that of the officers, that Thurston was not
posing a life-threatening hazard to them; (3) a department rule on the use of
firearms which in part required preliminary resort to less severe alternatives,
arguably ignored by the officers; (4) another part of the rule which
proscribed firing where there was substantial danger to innocent people,
arguably violated by two officers; (5) a dispatcher’s arguably overzealous
announcement on police radio; and (6) evidence of looseness in investigating
shootings.
Id. at 804.
27. Transcript of Kibbe Panel with Remarks by Ed Pikula and Terry Nagel at 6 (on
file with author).
28. Kibbe, 777 F.2d at 806.
29. Transcript of Kibbe Panel with Remarks by Ed Pikula and Terry Nagel at 3
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negligence—to hold a municipality liable under § 1983 for civil
rights violations resulting from a failure to properly train police. He
also appealed on the ground that the jury instructions “failed to
indicate that liability against the City could not be predicated on an
isolated incident of negligent training, but must instead be based on
‘a pattern of deliberate supervisory inaction and indifference.’”30
These issues were fully briefed and argued after the Court
granted certiorari.31 Nagel also presented a procedural argument to
the Court that proved dispositive. He contended that certiorari was
improvidently granted because the City had failed to object to the
jury instructions on gross negligence that it was challenging on
appeal.
The Kibbe case attracted the attention of leading civil rights and
civil liberties organizations. The American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) of Massachusetts filed an amicus brief supporting Thurston’s
estate.32 The ACLU brief, written by Marjorie Hines, later appointed
to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, argued that the proper
standard for police misconduct of the sort at issue in the case was
gross negligence. Hines also backed Nagel’s argument that the case
should be dismissed because Springfield failed to object to the jury
instructions it was challenging on further appellate review. 33 The
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) also filed an amicus brief authored by then-WNEU Law
Professor John Egnal.34 The NAACP argued that the Court should
reverse Monell and reject the requirement that a § 1983 violation be
premised on a finding of a municipal policy or custom; the nation’s
oldest civil rights organization further argued that the proper
standard for municipal liability should be respondeat superior.35
(Oct. 20, 2017) (on file with author).
30. Kibbe, 777 F.2d at 809.
31. See generally City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 475 U.S. 1064 (1986).
32. See generally Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and The Civil
Liberties Union of Massachusetts as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, City of
Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257 (1967) (No. 85-1217), 1985 WL 670242.
33. Id. at 7.
34. See generally Brief for the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, City of Springfield v. Kibbe,
480 U.S. 257 (1967) (No. 85-1217), 1986 WL 728323.
35. The amicus brief filed by the NAACP contended,
[N]either the legislative history of section 1983 nor considerations of policy
dictate a rule that requires proof of a government policy or custom in order to
establish municipal liability. In this regard, we urge the Court to review its
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The First Circuit’s ruling upholding the jury verdict for Kibbe
effectively ended the case. The Court never reached the merits of
the negligence issue presented in Kibbe. By a five-four vote, the
Court agreed with Nagel’s argument and found that the City’s failure
to object at trial to the jury instruction on gross negligence was
grounds to dismiss the case, finding that certiorari was
improvidently granted.36 However, Justice O’Connor’s dissent
portended what was to become the standard for municipal liability
in § 1983 claims.
Addressing the merits of the City’s argument, Justice O’Connor
wrote the following in the dissent she authored:
Because of the remote causal connection between omissions in a
police training program and affirmative misconduct by individual
officers in a particular instance, in my view the “inadequacy” of
police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only
where the failure to train amounts to a reckless disregard for or
deliberate indifference to the rights of persons within the city’s
domain.37

The next term, in Canton v. Harris, Justice White, mirroring the
language of Justice O’Connor’s dissent and writing for the majority,
held that “[t]he inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis
for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train . . . amounts to
deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons with
whom the police come into contact.” 38
The majority’s decision in Kibbe candidly recognized the
troubling legal foundation for the Court’s holding, noting that the
“inquiry” as to “whether there is a direct causal link between a
municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional
deprivation” is a “difficult one; one that has left this Court deeply
divided in a series of cases that have followed Monell.”39 The Harris
Court’s adoption of a deliberate indifference standard to establish
municipal liability for failure to properly train a police force did
overcome the divisions on the Court; the part of Justice White’s
opinion that established the deliberate indifference standard

earlier pronouncements on this issue, and adopt the respondeat superior
theory as the standard of proof in section 1983 cases.
Id. at 4.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Kibbe, 480 U.S. at 264.
Id. at 268–69 (O’Connor dissenting) (emphasis added).
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
Id. at 385–86.

2018]

RACIAL JUSTICE IN THE ERA OF #BLACKLIVESMATTER

401

secured nine votes.40
Going forward, the Court’s standard for municipal liability under
§ 1983 for a municipality’s failure to train and supervise police has
provided a consistently strong shield protecting cities and towns
from the financial consequences of countless instances of police
misconduct. As Terry Nagel explained, the trajectory of the Court’s
§ 1983 jurisprudence—beginning with Justice O’Connor’s prescient
dissent in Kibbe—was to weaken this critical statute whose purpose
was to end institutionalized state violence motivated by a racial
animus. Three decades after Kibbe, Terry Nagel’s observation is all
too evident in Springfield, one of many cities where, at this time, the
pattern of police misconduct decried by the BLM movement appears
to be intractable.
The publication of this volume of the WNE Law Review occurs as
public scrutiny of the Springfield police is underway. There is
renewed attention to dozens of civil rights lawsuits, hundreds of
citizen complaints and now a U.S. Justice Department investigation is
inquiring into what the Boston-based Lawyers Committee for Civil
Rights and Economic Justice calls an “absence of any sort of
accountability” for the Springfield police force. 41 The alleged
misconduct ranges from prisoner beatings and use of racial slurs to
roughing up a fellow narcotics officer on a federal task force, violent
arrests, and off-duty police assaults on Black and Brown residents of
the city. The tenor of the inquiry can be observed in the legal and
public scrutiny of a particularly notorious narcotics officer, Gregg
Bigda, accused of multiple civil rights violations that were captured
on video. This incident led federal Judge Michael A. Ponsor, who
presided over a lawsuit involving Bigda, to remark that he had “seen
videos of really violent arrests, and this got to me.” 42 As of this
writing, the U.S. Justice Department investigation into civil rights
abuses by Springfield police officers continues. And, despite some
significant settlement agreements for plaintiffs, local civil rights
leaders complain that the underlying issue in Kibbe—establishing

40. Id. Justice O’Connor authored a concurring opinion, signed by Justices Scalia
and Kennedy, that also registered dissent on the narrower question of whether a remand
of the case was needed. Id. at 393–94.
41. Laura Crimaldi & Shelley Murphy, ‘I Could Crush Your [expletive] Skull and
[expletive] Get Away With It.’ A Deep Look at the Springfield Police, BOSTON GLOBE (Sept.
1, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/09/01/springfield-police-facing-civilrights-probe/m7xG6NUxwFZ2o0gQwPqHVN/story.html.
42. Id.
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municipal accountability to deter future misconduct—remains the
issue.43
Bridgette Baldwin, the third Kibbe panelist, posed the following
important question at the opening of the symposium: [W]hat
accounts for the violations of civil rights and deaths of Eric Garner,
Michael Brown, Tamir Rice, and other Black and Brown citizens
victimized by police misconduct?44 Professor Baldwin’s answer, a
trenchant socio-legal analysis, is included in this symposium issue.45
Her essay examines the role of implicit bias of state actors—only
marginally cognizable under current legal paradigms—and the overcriminalization of communities of color as contributing to the
intersection of racism and police misconduct that gave rise to the
Black Lives Matter movement.46
These insights should be considered in light of the Kibbe case
and the development of the Supreme Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence.
As Terry Nagel noted, what “often happens when the Court gives the
powerless a tool, they almost immediately begin chipping away at
the tool, so that the power becomes less and less.” 47 This
symposium issue is dedicated to the issues brought to national
prominence by the Black Lives Matter movement and the efforts
underway across the globe and around the world to provide the
powerless with legal tools to confront the many forms of racial
injustice that we continue to face.

43. Id.
44. See generally Baldwin, supra note 3.
45. Id. at 442–46.
46. Id.
47. Transcript of Kibbe Panel with Remarks by Ed Pikula and Terry Nagel at 4 (Oct.
20, 2017) (on file with author).

